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Research

Below is a sample of my current research.
 
 A Defense of Parrying Responses to the Generality Problem |  Philosophical Studies. 174.8: 1935-1957.
 

Abstract

 

The generality problem is commonly seen as one of the most pressing issues for process reliabilism.  The generality problem starts with the following question: of all the process types exemplified by a given process token, which type is the relevant one for measuring reliability?  Defenders of the generality problem claim that process reliabilists have a burden to produce an informative account of process type relevance.  As they argue, without such a successful account, the reasonability of process reliabilism is significantly undermined.  One way for the reliabilist to respond is to attempt to construct such a theory of type relevance.  But another way of responding is to argue that, if finding an account of type relevance is a burden for the reliabilist, then it is also a burden for everyone (or, mostly everyone) else.  Thus, the generality problem doesn’t present some unique reason to reject process reliabilism.  I call this latter strategy a parrying response.  In this essay, I examine the contemporary parrying responses of Michael Bishop and Juan Comesaña, which have both faced recent criticism.  I respond to these critics, and argue that parrying responses are far stronger than defenders of the generality problem have appreciated.

 

Link to PDF of Penultimate Draft

Link of Published Version

 

 

Swampman: A Dilemma for Proper Functionalism |  Synthese. 198 (supp 7): 1725-1750.

 

Abstract

 

Proper functionalism claims that a belief has epistemic warrant only if it’s formed according to the subject’s truth-aimed cognitive design plan.  The most popular putative counter-examples to proper functionalism all involve agents who form beliefs in seemingly warrant-enabling ways that don’t appear to proceed according to any sort of design.  The Swampman case is arguably the most famous scenario of this sort.  However, some proper functionalists accept that subjects like Swampman have warrant, opting instead to adopt a non-standard account of design.  But critics of proper functionalism hold that this strategy comes at a high cost: the design-plan condition now seems explanatorily superfluous.  James Taylor construes cases like Swampman as posing a dilemma for the proper functionalist: either deny warrant in these cases and concede that proper functionalism doesn’t capture our intuitions, or affirm warrant and undermine the explanatory power of the design-plan condition.  Proper functionalists have replied to both horns of this dilemma.  Recently, Kenny Boyce and Andrew Moon have argued that warrant-affirming intuitions on cases like Swampman are motivated by a principle that has a clear counter-example.  Also, Alvin Plantinga presents a set of cases that supposedly cause problems for any analysis of warrant that lacks a design-plan condition.  In this essay, I present a counter-argument to Boyce and Moon’s argument, and show that a more robust reliability condition can accommodate Plantinga’s problem cases.  I conclude that we’re left with no good reason to doubt that cases like Swampman raise a troubling dilemma for the proper functionalist. 

 

Link to PDF of Penultimate Draft

Link to Pre-Published Version

 

 

Does Reliabilism have a Temporality Problem? Philosophical Studies. 176.8: 2208-2220.

 

Abstract

 

Matthew Frise claims that reliabilist theories of justification have a temporality problem—the problem of providing a principled account of the temporal parameters of a process’s performance that determine whether that process is reliable at a given time. Frise considers a representative sample of principled temporal parameters and argues that there are serious problems with all of them.  He concludes that the prospects for solving the temporality problem are bleak. Importantly, Frise argues that the temporality problem constitutes a new reason to reject reliabilism.  On this point, I argue that Frise is mistaken.  There are serious interpretive difficulties with Frise’s argument.  In this essay, I show that there are principled and reasonable temporal parameters for the reliabilist to adopt that successfully undermine the interpretations of Frise’s argument that only invoke plausible premises.  There are interpretations of Frise’s argument that leave reliabilism without a clear parameter solution.  However, I argue that these interpretations invoke controversial premises that are at best unmotivated, and at worst they merely re-raise older disputes about reliabilism.  In any event, the temporality problem fails to constitute a new reason to reject reliabilism. 

 

Link to penultimate draft

Link to published version

Rejecting the New Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem|  Episteme. 18.2: 289-312

Abstract

The generality problem is one of the most pressing challenges for process reliabilism about justification.  Thus far, one of the more promising responses is James Beebe’s tri-level statistical solution.  Despite the initial plausibility of Beebe’s approach, the tri-level statistical solution has been shown to generate implausible justification verdicts on a variety of cases.  Recently, Samuel Kampa has offered a new statistical solution to the generality problem.  Kampa argues that the new statistical solution overcomes the challenges that undermined Beebe’s original statistical solution.  However, there’s good reason to believe that Kampa is mistaken.  In this paper, I show that Kampa’s new statistical solution faces problems that are no less serious than the original objections to Beebe’s solution.  Depending on how we interpret Kampa’s proposal, the new statistical solution either types belief-forming processes far too narrowly, or the new statistical solution fails to clarify the epistemic implications of reliabilism altogether.  Either way, the new statistical solution fails to make substantive progress towards solving the generality problem.

Link to penultimate draft

Link to pre-published version

Knowledge, Evidence, and Multiple Process Types |  Forthcoming in Synthese

Abstract

The generality problem is one of the most pressing challenges for reliabilism.  The problem begins with this question: of all the process types exemplified by a given process token, which types are the relevant ones for determining whether the resultant belief counts as knowledge?  As philosophers like Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have argued, extant responses to the generality problem have failed, and it looks as if no solution is forthcoming.  In this paper, I present a new response to the generality problem that illuminates the nature of knowledge-enabling reliability.  My response builds upon the insights of Juan Comesaña’s well-founded solution to the generality problem, according to which relevant types are content-evidence pairs, i.e., descriptions of both the target belief’s content and the evidence on which the belief was based.  While most responses to the generality problem, including Comesaña’s, only posit one relevant type for any given process token, I argue that knowledge-enabling reliability requires a process token to be reliable with respect to multiple content-evidence pairs, each with varying degrees of descriptive specificity.  I call this solution Multi-type Evidential Reliabilism (MTE).  After offering a clear formulation of MTE, I conclude by arguing that MTE is sufficiently informative to rebut Conee and Feldman’s generality problem objection to a reliability condition on knowledge.

Link to penultimate draft

Link to pre-published version

Reliabilism Defended |  Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Abstract

Reliabilism about knowledge states that a belief-forming process generates knowledge only if its likelihood of generating true belief exceeds 50%.  Despite the prominence of reliabilism today, there are very few if any explicit arguments for reliabilism in the literature.  In this essay, I address this lacuna by formulating a new independent argument for reliabilism.  As I explain, reliabilism can be derived from certain key knowledge-closure principles. Furthermore, I show how this argument can withstand John Turri’s two recent objections to reliabilism: the argument from explanatory inference and the argument from achievements. 

Link to penultimate draft

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